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Though scholarship of the last three decades has begun to uncover a wide range of social, 
political and cultural associations with both Darwinian and Lamarckian thought in France 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,1 comparatively little work has yet 
been undertaken on the influence of evolutionary biology in French literary text of the 
mid-twentieth century.  In this article, I will consider the attitudes of three major French 
authors of that period with respect to the evolutionary theories of the notorious Soviet 
agronomist, Trofim Denisovich Lysenko.  Reading Lysenkoist themes in selected 
writings of Louis Aragon, Albert Camus and Vercors as an indicator of the authors’ 
respective attitudes towards Stalinism and French communism, I will also consider the 
extent to which the views expressed are characteristic of French modes of evolutionary 
thought.  It is my contention that the authors’ engagement with Lysenkoism has much to 
tell us not only about the moral and intellectual struggles preoccupying the French left 
wing in the early Cold War period, but also about the historically ingrained 
preconceptions surrounding evolutionary theory that made such conflicts possible in 
France to an extent that would have been inconceivable elsewhere.   
 
The Lysenko Affair 
Trofim Denisovich Lysenko (1898–1976) was a Ukrainian agronomist whose work found 
favour under Stalin, and whose influence on the wider sphere of Soviet science persisted 
through the 1950s.  Lysenko rejected the central tenet of modern, Mendelian genetics, 
according to which the processes of heredity take place through the communication of 
encoded organic material, the genes, from one generation to the next.  He instead 
considered that heredity was a function of the whole organism’s relationship with its host 
environment, reasoning that modification of the environment could effect the 
transformation of living organisms and, furthermore, that such acquired modifications 
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could be bequeathed to the organism’s offspring.  Astute and opportunistic, Lysenko 
presented his theories as the realization of certain aspects of the ideas of Marx, Engels 
and, most crucially, Stalin himself, thus securing the support of Soviet communist party 
intellectuals and ideologues from the late 1920s onward.  Joel and Dan Kotek explain that 
the party’s decision-makers disdained the idea, implicit in classical genetics, of the innate 
and therefore fixed inequality of individuals, preferring a biological theory which 
accorded a decisive role to environmental factors.  The reasoning behind the Soviet 
communists’ aversion towards Mendelian genetics was clear: if man was but the sum of 
his genes, and if genes could not be modified, what then would be the point of any 
aspiration to transform humanity and to reduce inequality?2   
In 1935, Lysenko began an aggressive campaign first to silence, then to eliminate 
his rivals from positions of influence in Soviet institutions, with disastrous results for 
some of Russia’s most eminent scientists and for Soviet science in general.  After World 
War II, Lysenko focused particularly on the critique levelled by Marx and Engels against 
Darwin’s notion of a universal and permanent ‘struggle for existence’, which could, in 
their view, have no place in an idealized classless society, the ultimate product of 
historical progress.3  This development became apparent in Lysenko’s thought around 
1945-6, the period in which Stalin declared the completion of the construction of 
socialism in the USSR.  Since social conflict was not a feature of Stalin’s idealized 
society, the concept of class struggle was henceforth to be considered obsolete.  By 
means of a certain inverted logic, however, Stalin’s grand ideological turn-around was 
also deemed to have serious implications for the Darwinian principles of evolutionary 
biology which had, in the first instance, been used to justify the necessity of social 
conflict: if the notions of ‘class struggle’ and the biological ‘struggle for life’ were 
interdependent, and if the former should prove to be outdated, then, it was reasoned, this 
would also be the case for the latter.4   
Lysenko incorporated this shift of thinking into his ideas not in the form of a 
direct critique of Darwin, but rather as the basis of a reinforced attack on his own 
scientific adversaries, the remaining Mendelian geneticists in the USSR who were 
pejoratively characterized as ‘neo-Darwinists’ and suspected of anti-communist heresy.5  
In the view of Lysenko and his supporters, any attempt to defend Mendelian genetics in 
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the USSR was tantamount to supporting Western bourgeois imperialist values supposed 
to have been derived from a crude social Darwinism whose utility as a theoretical 
justification extended all the way from the ruthless competition of American capitalism to 
the racial and social hierarchies of Mein Kampf and the eugenic horrors of Nazi Germany 
beyond.  Lysenko’s dominance over Soviet biological science was apparent at the special 
session of the Lenin Academy of Agronomical Sciences on 31 July 1948, during which 
he secured ministerial agreement to have his adversaries removed from institutional 
appointments and replaced by his own supporters.  He went on to announce the most 
audacious element of his theory, to wit the idea that environmental conditioning could 
directly stimulate the emergence of new plant species from old.  The events of summer 
1948 and their aftermath came to be known as the Lysenko affair.   
 
Lysenko in France 
Western scientists watched Lysenko’s rise to prominence in the 1930s and 1940s with 
astonishment, as there was little support for his theories outside the Soviet bloc.  It was 
only in communist circles that Lysenko enjoyed any credibility at all, thanks to the 
determined efforts of the Kominform.  In France, Maurice Thorez used his strong 
leadership style to impose strict discipline upon the Parti Communiste de France, an 
organization which, in Annie Kriegel’s view, showed clear structural similarities with the 
authoritarian Soviet state from which it drew its ideological inspiration.6  Committed to a 
campaign of struggle against American economic influences and Robert Schuman’s 
government through a campaign of strikes, demonstrations and civil disorder, the PCF 
came to be entrenched in a kind of pro-Stalinist sectarianism, offering its uncritical 
acceptance and spirited defence of all aspects of Soviet intellectual production, including 
the biological theories of Lysenko.  Consequently, several prominent French biologists, 
including Jean Rostand and the future Nobel laureate Jacques Monod felt compelled to 
cut their links with the PCF.  
The effects of the Lysenko affair were ultimately, however, felt by all card-
carrying communists and fellow travellers in France due to the polemic stimulated in the 
left-wing press.  Les Lettres françaises of 26 August 1948 featured an article by its 
Moscow correspondent, Jean Champenois, giving unqualified support to Lysenko’s 
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theories.  This was promptly followed by more in the same vein from Georges Cogniot in 
L’Humanité, who condemned Mendelian genetics, ‘the doctrine of an Austrian monk’, as 
being ‘bourgeois, metaphysical and reactionary’, before suggesting that the true modern 
inquisitors, guilty of acts of persecution against the advancement of science were none 
other than ‘the American bankers […] who can no more acknowledge the idea of 
inevitable change in nature than in society’.7  Other non-specialist publications became 
involved, with Action responding by attempting to reconcile aspects of Lysenkoism with 
Mendelian genetics.  The PCF consequently felt the need to offer clear guidance to its 
followers on Lysenko’s theories by providing an outline of his ideas and an account of 
the events at the Lenin Academy of Agronomical Sciences in the USSR the previous 
month.  While it would clearly have been preferable to confide this mission to a credible 
evolutionary biologist, no such person volunteered; for this reason the communist poet, 
novelist and journalist Louis Aragon was enlisted.   
Of the three French authors discussed in this article, Louis Aragon’s intervention 
in the Lysenko affair is by far the best known, not least because of the special edition of 
the literary revue Europe of October 1948 which he edited and which contains a detailed 
account of the Lenin Academy’s special session on Lysenkoism.  Picking up in his 
editorial the assertion made by Georges Cogniot in L’Humanité that classical genetics 
must be reactionary and therefore false because invented by ‘an Austrian monk’, and 
Lysenkoism true because of being progressive and proletarian, Aragon admits: 
‘Personally, I am not a biologist.  My confidence in Marxism naturally makes me wish 
that the Michurians [i.e. supporters of Lysenko] will be proved right in this dispute.’8  His 
unashamedly partisan stance clearly foregrounds the fact that he deems the scientific 
issues in question to be of little real relevance or, indeed, interest, when the much more 
pressing issue of ideological loyalties is at stake.  While Aragon’s posturing in the 
Lysenko affair won him little respect outside of the Communist inner circle, and 
continues to be roundly condemned by contemporary commentators as an act of ‘absolute 
mauvaise foi’9 and as a ‘dismal situation’,10 it demonstrates how attitudes towards 
Lysenkoism served as a kind of barometer of devotion to the Stalinist cause endorsed so 
enthusiastically by Thorez and the PCF establishment in the early Cold War period.   
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In direct contrast to Aragon, Albert Camus professes his disdain for Lysenko in 
L’Homme Révolté (translated as The Rebel) of 1951.  David Drake sees this work as ‘a 
radical […] denunciation of the concept of revolution’, which constitutes an important 
element of what he recognizes as ‘Camus’s unambiguous stand against Stalinism’, and 
which ‘was well received in the conservative press’.11  In the text Camus states that: 
 
[…] it is not surprising that, to make Marxism scientific […] it has been a necessary first 
step to render science Marxist through terror.  The progress of science, since Marx, has 
roughly consisted of replacing determinism […] by a doctrine of provisional probability.  
Marx wrote to Engels that the Darwinian theory constituted the very foundation of their 
method.  For Marxism to remain infallible, it has therefore been necessary to deny all 
biological discoveries made since Darwin.  As it happens that all discoveries since […] 
have consisted of introducing, contrary to the doctrines of determinism, the idea of hazard 
into biology, it has been necessary to entrust Lysenko with the task of disciplining 
chromosomes and of demonstrating once again the truth of the most elementary 
determinism.  This is ridiculous; to put the police force under Flaubert’s Monsieur 
Homais would be no more ridiculous and this is the twentieth century.12   
 
Camus’s comments bear witness to his growing contempt for the conceptual association 
of Marxism and science in French left-wing circles, a political arena which in Sunil 
Khilnani’s view had become the ‘domain of the irrational’, with Marxism’s radical 
departure from its scientific origins and subsequent ‘degenerat[ion] into ideology’13 
prefiguring its paradoxical emergence as a paradigm on which scientific theories were to 
be modelled.  While Camus fails to acknowledge that Marx and Engels did not retain 
their initial enthusiasm for Darwin, as we have already considered, he also appears to 
overlook the fact that Darwin’s theory had itself acknowledged the important role of 
provisional probability in respect of the random variations between organisms which 
were the raw material of natural selection; to that extent, Darwin may be seen to have 
actively anticipated the probabilistic innovations of twentieth-century science.  Camus’s 
scathing assessment of Lysenko’s role in attempting to impose determinisms of 
essentially ideological origin upon scientific phenomena nonetheless cuts to the very 
heart of the matter, and reveals his disdain for those communist sympathizers whose 
slavish devotion to the cause had led them to adopt a stance of willing blindness.  His 
overt dismissal of Lysenko and, by implication, of his followers in France and elsewhere, 
contrasts sharply with Aragon’s willing and very public abandonment of logic in the 
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name of loyalty to the PCF, and indirectly therefore, to Stalinism, some three years 
earlier.   
Yet while internal structural features of the PCF facilitated Thorez’s heavy-
handed leadership, and thus helped, for a time at least, to minimize resistance to 
Lysenkoism and other controversial imports from Stalinist Russia, there are additional 
reasons, related to the broader history of evolutionary thought in France, which explain 
why some French intellectuals were more receptive to Lysenkoism than might otherwise 
have been anticipated.  For while the theory of natural selection had proved controversial 
everywhere, the French were particularly hostile towards it. The highly centralized 
scientific community of late nineteenth-century France disdained Darwin on the ground 
that his theories, deduced from extensive natural observations rather than from 
experimental demonstration, were unverifiable and therefore fundamentally unsound, and 
also depended heavily on random chance, as we have already noted.14 The attitude of the 
French lay-public was, meanwhile, strongly influenced by the social Darwinist themes, 
considered the epitome of Anglo-Saxon brutality by many, that had been foregrounded by 
Clémence Royer in the first French translation of The Origin of Species in 1862.   In the 
decades that followed, popularized versions of the theory filtered into the wider public 
consciousness through the media of public education and the ever-expanding and 
increasingly diversified popular science press.15   
By the 1890s, literary authors from across the political spectrum were employing 
the rhetoric of le struggleforlife [sic] in ideological fiction. Right-wing reactionaries 
Maurice Barrès and Paul Bourget and anarchist sympathizer Octave Mirbeau attacked the 
early Third Republic’s meritocratic public education system and its colonial ambitions 
respectively as examples of social Darwinism in practice.16  Pronatalist authors such as 
Colette Yver and Marcel Prévost meanwhile worried that by offering women educational 
access to modern scientific ideas such as Darwin’s theory, the French State was 
encouraging them to abandon their traditional child-bearing role in order to participate 
more actively in the economic ‘struggle for life’, thus exacerbating the national 
depopulation crisis and the already stiff competition faced by their male counterparts in 
the professional employment market.17  Still others were concerned by the emergence of 
the United States of America as a prospective superpower whose vast economic capacity 
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and apparently unbridled ambition in commercial competition and colonialist expansion 
attested to the espousal of the doctrine of the ‘survival of the fittest’ at national level.18  
The popular success of such works undoubtedly helped to consolidate the conflation of 
Darwin’s biological theories with the social Darwinist themes accentuated by Clémence 
Royer in the French popular consciousness.  The range of highly charged themes with 
which they engaged reinforced Darwinism’s heavily politicized connotations, which 
were, for the most part, negative.  As Linda Clark notes: ‘Many French writers discussed 
the social import of Darwinism but few labelled themselves “social Darwinists.”  Self-
proclaimed enemies of social Darwinism were more in evidence.’19   
The alternative transformiste theories of the French Enlightenment thinker Jean-
Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829) viewed the relationship between physical environment 
and living organism as a kind of responsive partnership in which beneficial acquired 
modifications could be bequeathed to the organism’s offspring.  During the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, neo-Lamarckism enjoyed a resurgence of 
popularity in France.  With, as Stuart Persell notes, ‘the idea of inherited transformation 
of acquired characters serv[ing] as a biological justification for […] theoretical writings 
in politics, economics, criminology and a host of other fields,’ 20 neo-Lamarckism offered 
a biological justification for the notion that the French citizens of the future could be 
formed through conditioning in a carefully constructed socio-political environment.  
Lamarck’s appeal undoubtedly lay partly in the progressive connotations of his optimistic 
theories.  Positing evolutionary transformisme as a teleological process leading to the 
biological development of increasingly sophisticated organisms of which mankind was 
the ultimate product, neo-Lamarckism was the basis of a useful natural analogy for the 
development of increasingly progressive societies equipped with the machinery of 
advanced civilization such as ‘governmental organizations or ethical belief systems’.21   
That such altruistic mechanisms could be envisaged within the conceptual 
framework of a society modelled on a ‘scientific’ paradigm such as Lamarckian 
transformisme further added to the theory’s appeal in France.  Citing the ideas of Jean-
Louis de Lanessan, an influential figure and vocal neo-Lamarckian who ‘held positions of 
national stature as a scientist and politician’, and who embodied the secular and 
rationalistic spirit of the University-educated professionals who dominated early Third 
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Republic France, Persell highlights the notion that: ‘Contests for survival were essentially 
British […], while doctrines of reciprocal aid and biological tolerance were part of the 
French genius.  Worse, in German society such ideas had become a dangerous creed of 
force and immorality.’22  A chauvinistic adherence to a scientific paradigm of French 
origin, which ostensibly served as the basis for a set of progressive social and political 
values deemed also to be characteristically French, coupled with a strong dose of 
xenophobia towards the nation’s major military and economic rivals, thus underpinned a 
preference for Lamarck’s ideas over those associated with Darwin in the minds of 
numerous French intellectuals.   
Now, the extent to which Lysenko’s ideas were derivatives of those elaborated by 
Lamarck more than a century earlier has been a subject of debate among historians of 
science. Dominique Lecourt, for instance, maintains that the two theories are 
fundamentally differentiated in respect of the levels of importance that they respectively 
attribute to teleology.23   The similarities between the evolutionary theories of Lamarck 
and of Lysenko, notably in relation to the central roles that both attribute to 
environmental influences and the hereditary transmission of acquired characters, are 
nevertheless obvious.  Eva Schandevyl supports the view that scientists with neo-
Lamarckian leanings were predisposed to a qualified acceptance of the key principles of 
Lysenkoism, noting, with regard to the Belgian biologist and communist activist Paul 
Brien that being ‘a neo-Lamarckist rather than a neo-Darwinist […] was probably in part 
the cause of his enthusiasm for the theories of Lysenko.’24  Outside the scientific field, 
meanwhile, the features that had made neo-Lamarckism an attractive paradigm for 
progressively minded late-nineteenth-century French social theorists were causing great 
excitement in the Soviet communist hierarchy through the late 1940s and early 1950s.  
Viewed in the light not only of its favourable reception in Stalinist Russia, but also of its 
similarities with the neo-Lamarckian strain of social thought that had enjoyed high-
profile support in French pro-Republican scientific and political circles some fifty years 
earlier, it is not surprising that a measure of sympathy for Lysenkoism, or at least for 
certain of its key principles, should have been possible in France.  For the twin principles 
of environmental adaptation and the heredity of acquired modifications were already 
deeply ingrained in French evolutionary consciousness following the neo-Lamarckian 
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social experiments of the early Third Republic.  Their familiarity, as the conceptual 
pillars of a home-grown social evolution model, whose non-conflictual and progressive 
nature gave France the moral high ground over her various Anglo-Saxon-Germanic 
competitors, reputedly ruthless social Darwinists one and all, laid the ground for 
Lysenko, even in those sectors of the French left in which there was little sympathy for 
Stalin.  
Consequently, it is not necessarily the case that the evocation of Lysenko in 
French literary works functions exclusively, as with Aragon and Camus, as an indicator 
of the author’s endorsement, or otherwise, of Stalinism.  A more subtle engagement with 
some of the keys themes associated with Lysenkoism, integrating an appreciation of the 
moral and social implications of evolutionary thought with contemporary political 
commentary, is found in the post-war writings of Jean Bruller, who wrote as Vercors 
from 1942 onward, and whose status as co-founder of the resistance publishing house 
Éditions de Minuit and author of the seminal work of resistance fiction Le Silence de la 
mer (1942) has led to his subsequent writings being overshadowed.  These works 
nonetheless reveal Vercors’s fascination with the question of what makes us human, 
considered in terms of contemporary biological and ideological debates through which 
traces of Lysenkoism may be discerned.   
Now, while French literary evocations of Lysenko and his theories following the 
1948 affair need not have borne exclusively on questions of Stalinism, any analysis 
failing to take account of these considerations is likely to be incomplete.  This is 
particularly true of Vercors, who like many other French intellectuals of his time, had 
gravitated to the PCF after the war through a sense of loyalty fostered by the communists’ 
whole-hearted commitment to the Resistance without, however, fully embracing the 
party’s ideals or methods.  Russell Barnes sees in Vercors a ‘basic sympathy with the 
communists in the early Cold War years, and the wishful thinking that this engendered’, 
which rested on a belief that ‘the Soviet Union represented the best hope for mankind’s 
“liberation”’.25  His relationship with the PCF nevertheless took a definitive turn for the 
worse in 1956 following the Soviet repression in Hungary, homeland of Vercors’s father.  
As the PCF declined to condemn the Soviets for their actions, Vercors felt compelled to 
cut his links with the party, a decision discussed at length in P.P.C. (Pour Prendre 
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Congé) of 1957. His response contrasts with that of Aragon, who had struggled to stay 
loyal to Stalin after a 1952 visit to the USSR showed him the extent to which the Soviet 
regime was built on terror.  Doggedly upholding the supremacy of Soviet ideology in the 
face of his own and others’ reservations,26 Aragon’s actions of 1956 echoed his response 
to Lysenkoism a few years earlier.  Yet while Vercors did not hesitate to openly criticize 
both Aragon and the French communist hierarchy in relation to the former,27 his attitude 
towards the latter is overall less easy to gauge.  Succumbing to the initial temptation to 
view Lysenko as a simple indicator of loyalty to communist orthodoxy, Vercors’s 
subsequent writings reveal a more ambivalent perspective about an issue on which he had 
been well informed from the very beginning.28    
In an article written in December 1949, Vercors referred directly to Lysenko 
ostensibly in relation to his assertion of the basic human right to contest received ideas: 
 
I could arrogantly assert that this is the prerogative of the scientific mind: the ability to 
question, at any time, what seemed to have been definitively established – universal 
gravitation, the wave theory of light, the Mendelian laws of heredity.  Einstein, Planck or 
Lysenko are, above all, intellects capable of an incredible effort: that of contradicting in 
one fell swoop all that they had learned, all that they had thought they knew for certain.29 
 
The illustrious company in which Lysenko is depicted, as well as the clear approbation 
that his rewriting of evolutionary science appears to elicit from Vercors, indicate the 
latter’s broad approval of his theories.  Given that Vercors, who had begun his studies in 
the pure sciences before moving into engineering, was readily conversant with scientific 
logic, it is perhaps rather astonishing that he was so uncritical of Lysenko’s ideas. Barnes, 
however, suggests that in matters of political conscience, ‘Vercors was not always clear-
sighted in perceiving where truth and justice actually lay’,30 citing several examples from 
the late 1940s to which the above statement of support for Lysenko, understood as a 
gesture of political loyalty rather than as a scientifically reasoned judgement, might be 
added.  Even more surprising, however, is the fact that Vercors wrote the article from 
which the above citation is drawn in order to uphold criticisms of the PCF that he had 
recently published in the Catholic revue Esprit.31  Suggesting, however, that despite 
Vercors’s ‘strong public challenge to the official party line, […] his article in Esprit also 
reaffirmed in the clearest terms his continued endorsement of the communist cause’,32 
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Barnes offers what may at the same time be the only feasible explanation for the author’s 
otherwise improbable approval of Lysenko’s contribution to modern science cited above, 
which appears in the follow-up to the aforementioned piece in Esprit.   
Yet while for the Vercors of 1949, approval of Lysenkoism served to publicly 
demonstrate his continuing faith in the PCF and through it, the USSR, there may have 
been further aspects of the theory which appealed to him.  Evolutionary themes with 
Lysenkoist resonances continued to feature in the author’s post-war writings, in, for 
instance, the novels Les Animaux dénaturés (1952) and Sylva (1960), both conceived as 
demonstrations of Vercors’s basic thesis that: ‘What makes a man is his struggle against 
nature.’33  Viewing humanity not as an innate condition but rather as a state to be attained 
by overcoming the baseness of our essential nature, Vercors’s ideas is that this essentially 
moral struggle requires man to overcome not only the forces of nature in and around him, 
but also ‘those other adversaries – those men who oppress and kill their fellows, and in so 
doing serve as accomplices of metaphysical evil’.34  Now, Vercors’s notion that the 
evolution of humanity is dependent on the suppression of struggle among fellow-men 
evokes one of the key themes of Lysenkoism, i.e. the idea that intra-species struggle is 
not a feature of natural evolution, but is rather an error on Darwin’s part which has been 
appropriated by bourgeois capitalists and subsequently used as a justification for all sorts 
of abuses.  Targeting American scientists as the products of bourgeois ideology, Lysenko 
explained in a 1947 article: 
 
Servants of capitalism, they don’t need to struggle against the elements, against nature, 
they need a struggle between two varieties of wheat, belonging to the same species, and 
this struggle is invention on their part.  Thanks to the supposed existence of intra-species 
struggle, this ‘eternal law of nature’ that they’ve created from scratch, they try to justify 
class struggle, the oppression of the blacks by the whites.  How could they ever own up to 
the non-existence of intra-species struggle?35 
 
In accusing his ‘bourgeois’ rivals in the West of formulating scientific paradigms with the 
specific intention of justifying the existence of oppression and inequality in their 
societies, Lysenko effectively launches an attack on the social Darwinist interpretations 
of the theory of natural selection which, as we have already noted, had continued to 
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inspire widespread French hostility since the publication of The Origin of Species in 
1859.    
In situating the biological and moral complexities surrounding the notion of intra-
species struggle at the very heart of Les Animaux dénaturés of 1952, Vercors therefore 
draws not only on a long-established strain of French thought, but also evokes more 
recent debates on the French left stimulated by the Lysenko Affair.  In the novel, Doug 
Templemore, an English journalist participates in an expedition to the jungles of Papua 
New Guinea during which living examples of a kind of ‘missing link’ between man and 
the higher primates are found.  If the ‘Tropis’ are classified as animals, they stand to be 
exploited as slave labour by Australian corporate interests, who will then be able to 
compete with their British rivals in the textile industry; legal recognition of the Tropis’ 
humanity is therefore the key to their freedom.  In order to force the issue, Templemore 
kills the offspring he has sired by means of artificial insemination with a Tropi mother 
and has himself arrested and charged with murder.  His guilt, and ensuing death by 
capital punishment, rests on whether the hybrid offspring is deemed in an English court 
of law to have been human or animal.  While the first trial ends with a hung jury, the 
second ends in a satisfactory compromise due to the judge’s good sense in contriving to 
have Templemore acquitted while acknowledging the full human rights recently 
conferred upon the Tropis by an Act of Parliament.  This Act also, conveniently, serves to 
protect British commercial interests by preventing Australian competitors from using the 
Tropis as slave labour.   
The difficulty in providing a precise delineation between man and beast is, 
however, in Vercors’s view, no abstract philosophical debate.  It rather provides a 
framework in which to consider the issue of man’s inhumanity in relation to those whom 
he is willing to recognise only as lesser versions of himself, as foregrounded by the still 
recent events of the Holocaust and the racist theories pervading the decolonisation 
question, as Templemore reflects: 
 
Here then, all ready to reappear […] are the grimacing face of racism and its infernal 
consequences.  And what sort of racism…!  A racism in whose name whole populations 
will tomorrow be deprived of their membership of the human race and of all ensuing 
rights, to be sold in their turn as mere livestock…Where will we set the limits…? 
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Wherever the strongest [‘les plus forts’] desire it to be set.  Imagine what will happen to 
the natives in the colonies, to the blacks in the states where segregation is practised!  And 
more generally, to all ethnic minorities!36 
 
In his allusion to the political and economic dominance of the strong over the weak, 
Vercors seems to rail against the crude social Darwinism which both French neo-
Lamarckians and Soviet Lysenkoists habitually held up in opposition to their own 
supposedly progressive egalitarianism.  This sentiment is even more explicit in Zoo, ou 
l’Assassin philanthrope, the play based on Les Animaux dénaturés that Vercors published 
in 1964, in which one of the expedition members proposes: ‘That racism is the law of the 
survival of the fittest, nothing more.  And […] the day that the peoples of Asia and Africa 
become the strongest, then they’ll be able to do the same to us.’37   
It is also, then, significant that Vercors chose to situate this work outside the 
domain of French influence, preferring, in the manner of numerous French thinkers 
before him, to associate a crude social Darwinist model of social and economic relations 
with the abuses of human rights considered to be characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon 
world.  Not content merely to depict the subordination of the debate about the nature of 
humanity to the economic interests of the British and their colonial competitors in 
Australia, Vercors goes on to ironically expose the contemporary race debate, based on 
the clear presumption of a hierarchy of races headed by the Anglo-Saxon, through the 
intermediary of the English palaeontologist Greame who states: ‘And in fact, between 
[…] between a British citizen and a…eh…and the least civilised Negrito, the biological 
distance is substantially less than that separating a Negrito and the chimpanzee…’38  Yet 
while the evocation of this historical French hostility towards the Anglo-Saxon world 
may well have been an appeal to the prejudices and preconceptions of a French audience, 
it is also possible that Vercors used the attribution of such attitudes to the Anglo-Saxon as 
a means of levelling a more generalized critique of certain unpalatable aspects of 
colonialism that surely applied just as much to France as to her outre-Manche  rival.   
By the late 1950s, Vercors had well and truly distanced himself from the PCF, 
and Lysenko’s influence had been greatly diminished both within and outside the USSR.  
Yet while the intertwined political and scientific considerations that had informed his 
writings of the late 1940s and early 1950s were perhaps no longer foremost among his 
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concerns, reflections on the nature of humanity continued to preoccupy Vercors, as 
shown in the 1960 novel Sylva, which recounts the transformation of a fox into a woman 
in the 1930s English countryside.  While the reasons behind Sylva’s miraculous physical 
transformation remain obscure, in psychological terms she is presented as ‘a human 
creature in a state as pure as that of the original mutation, without ancestors and without 
social conditioning, emerging among us completely fresh […] from animality’.39  Sylva 
is thus conceived as a kind of living carte blanche whose personal development from the 
wordless savagery of ‘the palaeolithic era’ to the ‘calm assurance of modern British 
civilization’40 effectively recapitulates all of mankind’s evolution in the course of 
months.  Yet in returning to the themes of the boundary between animality and humanity, 
and man’s struggle to acquire humanity which are at the heart of Les Animaux dénaturés, 
Vercors also indistinctly evokes the Lysenkoist theme of species transformation by means 
of environmental conditioning. For it is Sylva’s education by her mentor, a good-hearted 
English country gentleman named Richwick, which is seen to have led to the suppression 
of her brutal natural instincts and her acquisition of the self-consciousness, reason and 
morality which, in the author’s view, constitutes the true ‘point of no return’41 in respect 
of Sylva’s attainment of humanity.  It may then be that the optimistic and progressive 
connotations associated with both French neo-Lamarckism and Soviet Lysenkoism 
continued to inform Vercors’s ideas.  
 
Conclusion 
Given the scientific and political controversy that surrounded Lysenkoism, it is hardly 
surprising that direct references should be conspicuously absent from Vercors’s writings 
after 1949.  In view of his subsequent break with communism and continuing interest in 
biology, it is even possible that Vercors came to be embarrassed by his apparent early 
enthusiasm for Lysenko.  In Questions sur la vie (1973), an extended dialogue between 
the author and the biologist Ernest Kahane about the philosophical implications of 
modern biology, the latter suggests that ‘the neo-Lamarckian position, already damaged 
by its lack of experimental verification, has been further compromised by the deplorable 
[‘pénible’] Lysenkoist episode’,42 a statement which Vercors neither contradicts nor 
returns to anywhere in the text.   His silence suggests that he may well have preferred to 
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draw a cloak of discretion over his own positive responses, however limited these may 
have been, to an episode whose historical significance ultimately has more to do with the 
conflict between intellectual honesty and political loyalty facing French communists and 
fellow-travellers in the early Cold War period than with the development of evolutionary 
science.    
Yet while it is easy to understand why figures such as Vercors and Aragon may, 
in later life, have preferred not to dwell on their respective pronouncements on 
Lysenkoism made at the height of the tensions generated by the Cold War, the 
publication in France in 1990 of Les Robes blanches, Vladimir Doudintsev’s satirical 
novel recounting the events of the Lysenko affair, nonetheless provided an opportunity 
for France’s literary left to address the issue from the position of security engendered by 
the recent fall of the Berlin Wall.  Presented to the French audience as one of 
‘perestroika’s great bestsellers’,43 the text was praised in the communist daily 
L’Humanité for its neo-Tostoian breadth of vision as well as for its historical accuracy 
and quality of construction.44  The description of the Lysenko affair as a witch-hunt 
carried out against the ‘partisans of the “the monk Mendel”’ also, however, contains a 
kind of mea culpa on behalf of French communism in relation to the Lysenko affair.  For 
in this veiled allusion to Georges Cogniot’s attempt to undermine classical genetics in his 
August 1948 article which appeared in L’Humanité itself, and to which, as we have 
already noted, Louis Aragon made subsequent reference in the October 1948 issue of 
Europe, a tacit and long overdue acknowledgement of the pure mauvaise foi shown by 
the Parti Communiste de France and numerous of its supporters in respect of the 
notorious affair is surely to be found.      
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